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I. INTRODUCTION
The TRIPS agreement does not and should not prevent
members from taking measures to protect public heath.1
--- World Trade Organization, Doha Summit
2001.
With the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (―TRIPS‖)2, advocates
for patent protection rejoiced, while those concerned about
world health and access to medicines lamented. One of the most
visible results following the enactment of TRIPS in 1995 was
higher drug prices for health programs in developing and least
developed countries (―LDCs‖).3 At the same time, the poorest
regions of the world, mostly encompassing sub-Saharan Africa,
had the highest concentrations of people with treatable diseases
such as AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria.4
TRIPS sought to balance patent protection and access to
medicines, but the results indicate that TRIPS has only decrease
access to affordable medicines. Numerous factors contribute to
the lack of access, but one of the largest barriers is the
medicines‘ exorbitant cost. High costs are a direct result of
TRIPS patent protection, which prevents the production of
generic drugs that can be sold at a lower cost. 5 For example, the
1

World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health of 14 November 2001, ¶ 4, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41
I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
2
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments--Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
3
Jennifer May Rogers, Note, The TRIPS Council‟s Solution to the
Paragraph 6 Problem: Toward Compulsory Licensing Viability for Developing
Countries, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 443, 443 (2004).
4
Erin M. Anderson, Note, Unnecessary Deaths and Unnecessary Costs:
Getting patented Drugs to Patients Most in Need, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 85, 85
(2009).
5
Jessica L. Greenbaum, Comment, TRIPS and Public Health: Solutions for
Ensuring Global Access to Essential AIDS Medication in the Wake of the Paragraph
6 Waiver, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 142, 142–43 (2008); Alan O. Sykes,
TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the DOHA “Solution,” 3 CHI. J.
INT‘L L. 47, 47 (2002); See Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2008 Report on the
Global AIDS Epidemic 157 (Aug. 2008), available at
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Glob
al_report.asp.
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United Nations Commission on Human Rights reported that the
HIV drug Fluconazole costs $55 in India, where the drug does
not enjoy patent protection. This same drug costs $697 in
Malaysia, $703 in Indonesia, and $817 in the Philippines, all
places where the drug is patented.6
Unfortunately, ―an
abundance of poor health contributes to status as a poor country,
just as a poor country translates into high concentrations of poor
health.‖7 Additionally, restrictions on compulsory licensing
under Article 31(f) kept developing countries and LDCs from
actually manufacturing necessary medicines for exportation or
importation, further inhibiting access to life saving
pharmaceuticals.8 Thus, the practical effects of TRIPS (e.g.,
increased drug costs with restrictions on obtaining affordable
generic versions)9 prompted the World Trade Organization
(―WTO‖) to issue a declaration at the 2001 Doha Ministerial,
stressing the importance of taking the necessary ―measures to
protect public health.‖10 One measure subsequently taken was
the amendment Article 31-bis.11 This amendment modifies some
of the restrictions originally placed on the compulsory licensing
scheme. While WTO members officially accepted the
amendment on December 6, 2005, the amendment will not
become part of TRIPS until two thirds of the WTO countries
ratify it.12 The WTO first imposed a December 2007 deadline
for ratification,13 but then extended it to December 2009,14 and

6

U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm‘n on the Promotion
and Prot. of Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4
/590516104e92e87bc1256aa8004a8191/$FILE/G0114345.pdf.
7
Anderson, supra note 4, at 86 n.8.
8
CARLOS M. CORREA, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL
DECISION ON PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
AND PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (2004) (Health Economics and Drugs, EDM Series No.16).
9
Ellen ‗t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way From Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 27, 27 (2002).
10
Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 4.
11
Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/L/641 (Dec. 8,
2005) [hereinafter Article 31-bis].
12
Press Release, World Trade Org., Members OK Amendment to Make
Health Flexibility Permanent (Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Amendment Press Release],
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.
13
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 6 December 2005,
WT/L/641 (2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm.
14
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 18 December 2007,
WT/L/711 (2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wt-l711_e.pdf.
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subsequently to December 2011.15 As of February 2010, only
fifty-four member countries have ratified the amendment.16
This Note examines why the amendment, which was created
to provide flexibility and better access to medicines, has not yet
achieved the necessary signatures for ratification. Part II
provides an overview of compulsory licensing schemes and
explores how Article 31-bis infuse greater flexibility into the
current TRIPS scheme. Part III explores the obstacles many
countries face in their efforts to ratify Article 31-bis, including
procedural hurdles and ambiguity in defining adequate
remuneration under the amendment. Part IV discusses Rwanda‘s
experience in invoking Article 31-bis and the paragraph six
waiver. Finally, Part V suggests that pharmaceutical companies
may be willing to negotiate lower prices as an alternative to
compulsory licensing.
II. WHILE TRIPS ARTICLE 31(F) PREVENTS COUNTRIES
FROM GRANTING COMPULSORY LICENSES IN CERTAIN
SITUATIONS, ARTICLE 31-BIS ELIMINATES SOME OF THESE
RESTRICTIONS
A. A Compulsory License is a Government Grant to Use a
Patent Without the Permission of the Patent Holder
One goal of TRIPS was to alleviate the barriers imposed on
WTO member countries by patent protections, in cases where a
legitimate public need arises.17 The WTO accomplished this
goal by including language in Article 31 permitting countries to
issue compulsory licenses.18 A compulsory license is issued by
the government, and allows a competitor of the patent owner to
manufacture, produce, process, or sell the patented invention
without the patent owner‘s permission, in order to address a
public need.19 Compulsory licenses historically were issued for
purposes such as:

15
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 17 December 2009,
WT/L/785 (2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wt-l785_e.pdf.
16
WTO Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement
[hereinafter Status of Ratification],
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2010).
17
Amendment Press Release, supra note 12.
18
TRIPS, supra note 2, at 1210.
19
Mike Gumbel, Comment, Is Article 31 Bis Enough? The Need to Promote
Economies of Scale in the International Compulsory Licensing System, 22 TEMP.
INT‘L & COMP. L.J. 161, 162 (2008).
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to deal with a situation in which a patent owner is
unwilling to work his invention[;] to satisfy an unmet
demand from the public for a patented product[;] to
introduce a price-reducing competition for important but
expensive products, e.g. drugs[;] to deal with a situation
in which refusal to license a patent, or the imposition of
unreasonable terms, is preventing the exploitation of
another invention which is of technical or economic
importance; to prevent abuses of patent rights . . . [; and]
to prevent the creation of potential competitioninhibiting monopolies.20
By the 1990‘s, roughly one hundred countries had incorporated
some type of compulsory licensing scheme, though relatively
few compulsory licenses have ever actually been issued.21
Under TRIPS, the purposes and requirements for issuing a
compulsory license are narrow. A government seeking to issue
a compulsory license typically must first attempt to negotiate
with the patent holder for a potential license.22 However, a
government may waive this requirement ―in the case of a
national emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency or
[when the compulsory license is limited to] public noncommercial use.‖23 ―The public interest of achieving broader
access to the patented [medicine] is considered more important
than the private interest of the [patent] holder in fully exploiting
his exclusive rights.‖24 Nevertheless, compulsory licensing still
requires appropriate remuneration to the patent holder for
violating his exclusive rights under the patent.25
Despite the provisions permitting compulsory licensing, few
developing countries have actually invoked their rights under
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.26 It was not until 2007 that
emerging markets found the political will to invoke compulsory
licensing. For example, in January 2007 Thailand issued a
license for generic manufacturing of a HIV/AIDS drug patented
20

Graham Dutfield, Delivering Drugs to the Poor:Will the TRIPS
Amendment Help?, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 107, 110–11 (2008) (emphasis added).
21
Id. at 111-12 (noting that Canada, who issued 613 compulsory licenses
for the manufacture or importation of medicines between 1969 and 1992, represents
an anomaly to the infrequent issuing of compulsory licenses).
22
TRIPS, supra note 2, at 1209.
23
Id.
24
Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the
Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 73, 77 (2004).
25
TRIPS, supra note 2, at art. 31(h).
26
Gail E. Evans, Strategic Patent Licensing for Public Research
Organizations: Deploying Restriction and Reservation Clauses to Promote Medical
R&D in Developing Countries, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 175, 183 (2008).
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by U.S.-based Abbott Laboratories.27 Brazil followed Thailand‘s
lead and issued a compulsory license for a Merck-patented
HIV/AIDS drug in May 2007.28
Compulsory licensing inherently seems to advocate a moral
and altruistic duty to protect society from unreasonable patent
exclusivity.29 However, patent holders and countries advocating
for strong intellectual property rights openly repudiate countries
that invoke compulsory licensing.30 The United States has
―openly expressed its displeasure when developing country
governments have brought in measures to prioritize public
health in ways that limit the full enjoyment of the intellectual
property rights of U.S. businesses.‖31
Despite this public condemnation,32 the United States itself
has issued compulsory licenses under its own domestic laws.
When there was an Anthrax scare in 2001, the U.S. government
sought to stockpile vast quantities of Bayer‘s ciprofloxacin
(―Cipro‖), an anthrax antibiotic.33 It was mostly concerned with
acquiring large amounts of the drug, but also wanted it at a
reduced price. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy
Thompson threatened Bayer, saying that if it did not lower the
price of Cipro by fifty-percent, then the government would
acquire the drug from other sources.34 This mere threat induced
Bayer to strike a deal with the U.S. government. Bayer agreed to
supply it with Cipro at a significantly reduced cost.35 The United
States‘ use of compulsory licensing, while hypocritical, is a
perfect example of what should be done in a public emergency.
It also demonstrates how the provisions in TRIPS can protect all
countries in much the same way through a compulsory licensing
scheme.

27

Elizabeth H. Williams, Just Say „No‟ to Big Pharma, 170 FAR E. ECON.
REV. 43, 43 (2007).
28
Evans, supra note 26, at 184.
29
See generally International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 4 (asking State Parties to recognize an
individual‘s right to enjoy ―the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health‖).
30
Sykes, supra note 5, at 50.
31
Dutfield, supra note 20, at 115.
32
See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical
Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining
WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT‘L ECON.
L. 1069, 1088 (1996).
33
See Keith Bradsher, Bayer Agrees to Charge Government a Lower Price
for Anthrax Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at B8.
34
Id. The US government seriously considered using the Indian version of
Cipro, even though Bayer owned the US patent. See Ellen‘t Hoen & Pierre Chirac,
Op-Ed., Don‟t Renege on Doha, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, June 25, 2002.
35
Bradsher, supra note 33.
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B. Article 31-bis Infuses More Flexibility into TRIPS‟
Compulsory Licensing Scheme
While the TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme articulates a
way for developing nations to access patented drugs,36 TRIPS
also requires that the compulsory license primary benefit the
domestic market only.37 In other words, a country may issue a
compulsory license only to a domestic manufacturer who does
not export drugs. However, the countries in most need of the
drugs do not have adequate manufacturing capacities to produce
them.38 Thus, while the TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme
gives developing countries the ability to avoid high costs
associated with recognizing pharmaceutical patents, licensing
requirements still erect hurdles for these countries that lack
sufficient manufacturing capability.39 The domestic restriction
unduly burdens importing countries wishing to obtain the drugs.
It also hinders exporting countries with the manufacturing
capability because it keeps them from selling generic
medications to LDCs or other developing countries.40
India provided the biggest impetus for review of Article
31(f)‘s domestic supply requirement and ultimately for the
proposed paragraph 6 waiver / Article 31-bis. During the
transitional period after TRIPS‘ initial implementation, India
developed a world-class generic drug production capacity.41
India did not grant patent protection to pharmaceuticals before
TRIPS. Therefore, after the enactment of TRIPS, it would not be
required to grant such protection until 2005, when the transition
period ended. During the ten-year transition period, India was
able to manufacture drugs ―that were otherwise on-patent in
developed (and many developing) countries.‖42 India‘s generic
industry was so successful that all major drug procurement
agencies like UNICEF, IDA, Doctors without Borders, as well
as countries like Lesotho and Zimbabwe, purchased generic
drugs from the Indian pharmaceutical industry. 43 However,
36

Rogers, supra note 3, at 447.
TRIPS, supra note 2, at art. 31(f).
38
Anderson, supra note 4, at 96.
39
Gumbel, supra note 19, at 162.
40
See Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines:
Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 613, 617
(2004).
41
Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round‟s Public
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines
Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 921, 934 (2007).
42
Id.
43
ANAND & ANAND ADVOCATES, REPORT ON IMPLICATIONS OF THE
PROPOSED ARTICLE 31BIS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT xxxiii,
37
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under TRIPS, any drugs developed in India after 2005 would
have to be patented. The domestic distribution requirement of
Article 31(f) also prevents India from exporting drugs to other
countries or world health organizations in need.
The WTO General Council recognized that the domestic
distribution requirement made a compulsory licensing scheme
useless for many countries. The General Council announced an
interim waiver allowing countries to export generic medicines to
countries that were issued a compulsory license, and are in
need.44 The WTO members ultimately negotiated and codified
this ―paragraph 6‖ waiver into the amendment Article 31-bis.45
While the amendment does not go into effect until two-thirds of
the WTO members ratify it, the amendment was accepted by the
body and opened for signature on December 6, 2005.46
The main purpose of Article 31-bis is to waive the domestic
supply requirement under Article 31(f).47 Article 31-bis
accomplish this in two ways. First, it allows a country to grant a
compulsory license to import a particular drug. This allows
countries lacking sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity
within their own country to still obtain cheaper generic drugs.48
Second, the amendment allows a country, such as India, to
export a generic drug to a country that has issued a compulsory
license.49 Other substantive provisions include:
1) no restrictions on the types of drugs for which a
compulsory license may be granted;50
2) importing countries (LDCs excluded) must notify
TRIPS of their eligibility and desire to use the
compulsory licensing under the Article 31-bis
scheme;51
3) in determining eligibility for a country to import a
http://www.nhicindia.org/content/ wrindia/Nupur/doc7011131200957.pdf (last visited
May 8, 2010).
44
James T. Tsai, Note, Not Tripping over the Pebbles: Focusing on
Overlooked TRIPS Article 66 for Technology Transfer to Solve Africa‟s AIDS Crisis,
11 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 447, 458 (2007).
45
Article 31-bis, supra note 11.
46
See Amendment Press Release, supra note 12; Status of Ratification,
supra note 16.
47
Article 31-bis, supra note 11.
48
Baker, supra note 40, at 640–42.
49
See Article 31-bis, supra note 11, at Annex to the Protocol Amending the
TRIPS Agreement ¶ 1.
50
Abbott & Reichman, supra note 41, at 936-37 (pointing out that many
developed nations, including the United States and the EU, wanted to limit the
compulsory licenses to drugs for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria or for ―grave‖
public health problems. However, developing countries were able to negotiate so that
the Amendment imposes NO restrictions).
51
Article 31-bis, supra note 11, at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 1(b).
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specific drug, the importing country must either be
an LDC or make a determination in accordance with
the Appendix to Article 31-bis that the country lacks
the manufacturing capacity for that specific drug;52
4) importing countries must issue a compulsory license,
but only if there is domestic patent protection OR the
country is NOT an LDC;53
5) importing countries must also notify the TRIPS
Council, specifying the name of the products and the
expected quantities to be imported;54
6) exporting countries must also issue a compulsory
license;55
7) exporting countries may export only the requested
amount, must distinguish the drugs by special
packaging or labeling, and must record each export
shipment on a WTO website;56
8) exporting countries must pay remuneration to the
patent holder, taking into account the economic
circumstances of the importing country;57
9) importing countries must ―take reasonable
measures‖ to prevent re-exportation of the drug so
that the medicines are in fact used for public health
purposes;58 and
10) no Member state shall challenge any measures taking
in conformity with Article 31-bis.59
III. ARTICLE 31-BIS FACIALLY CAN IMPROVE ACCESS TO
VITAL MEDICINES, BUT TOO MANY OBSTACLES PREVENT ITS
EFFECTIVENESS
The procedural requirements of Article 31-bis as outlined
above are numerous, and many criticize the amendment for
imposing too many unnecessary obstacles.60 Controversy
surrounds the adoption of Article 31-bis. Particular criticism
comes from NGOs and other similar agencies dealing with

52
Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 2(a)(ii), App. to the Annex of the
TRIPS Agreement.
53
Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 2(a)(iii).
54
Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 2(a)(i).
55
Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 2(b).
56
Id.
57
Id. at Annex to the Protocol ¶ 2.
58
Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 3.
59
Id. at Annex to the Protocol ¶ 4.
60
Abbott & Reichman, supra note 41, at 932. See also MEDECINS SANS
FRONTIERES, DOHA DERAILED: A PROGRESS REPORT ON TRIPS AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES, Aug. 27, 2003, http://www.msf.org.au/uploads/media/cancun.pdf.
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global health.61 Specifically, Doctors without Borders
characterized Article 31-bis as ill-researched and not a viable
plan to increase access to medicine.62 Doctors without Borders
voiced its skepticism to the amendment by stating: ―the decision
shows that the WTO is ignoring day-to-day reality of drug
production and procurement. The amendment has made
permanent a burdensome drug-by-drug, country-by-country
decision-making process…‖63
A. The Many Requirements Under Article 31-bis Make
Ratification Unappealing to Many Developing Countries
With only a small number of WTO member states ratifying
the amendment, many critics argue that the cross-boundary
compulsory licensing procedures outlined in Article 31-bis
remain too complex, especially for developing countries to
understand.64 Some also argue that generic pharmaceutical
companies may want to avoid the rigmarole of negotiating with
both domestic patent owners and foreign governments before
they can provide the necessary medicines.65 Furthermore, the
process of both the exporting and importing countries obtaining
compulsory licenses increases transaction costs and possibilities
for delay.66
The public notification provision in Article 31-bis that
requires a showing of a country‘s intent to use a compulsory
licensing scheme is unreasonable and unnecessary. Some
commentators surmise that no developing country had made the
general notification of intent, due to fears of hostile criticism or
even retaliatory action from developed countries, including the
United States and the E.U.67 Developing countries fear implying
that they may one day choose to invoke compulsory licensing.
61

E.g., Roger Bate & Richard Tren, Health Policy Outlook on the WTO and
Access to Essential Medicines: Recent Agreements, New Assignments, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL‘Y RES., Feb. 13, 2006,
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060216_19636HPO200604_g.pdf.
62
Tsai, supra note 44, at 458 (in which Medecins San Frontieres cited the
procedural requirements for both importing and exporting countries as overly
burdensome and bureaucratic and held that these requirements are a main reason why
Article 31-bis will not increase access to medicines). See also Members Strike Deal
on Trips and Public Health; Civil Society Unimpressed, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG. (Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 7, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Society Unimpressed with
Article 31-bis].
63
Society Unimpressed with Article 31-bis, supra note 62, at 3.
64
Dutfield, supra note 20, at 123.
65
Id.
66
Mark C. Lang, Note, What a Long, Strange “TRIPS” It‟s Been:
Compulsory Licensing from the Adoption of TRIPS to the Agreement on
Implementation of the Doha Declaration, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 331,
343 (2004).
67
Abbott & Reichman, supra note 41, at 938.
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The provision requiring general notification to the TRIPS
Council serves no purpose other than to publically broadcast
desires to use compulsory licensing along with erecting political
barriers limiting the usefulness of Article 31-bis.68 While this
is just one example of an unnecessary procedural requirement,
TRIPS and Article 31-bis are replete with administrative
headaches. Simplifying the scheme could induce more countries
to ratify the amendment.
B. Pressure from Developed Countries and the Pharmaceutical
Industry Weigh Heavily in a Developing Country‟s Decision to
Ratify Article 31-bis
Developed countries, known for protecting intellectual
property rights, pressure developing countries to refrain from
using compulsory licenses. They do this even as they invoke
compulsory licenses on their own behalf (e.g., the United States
and Cipro in 2001).69 In 2001, the U.S. sought sanctions against
Brazil for invoking a compulsory license on a U.S. patented
drug. This sent a strong message to the rest of the world that the
U.S. was willing to take extreme measures to protect its
pharmaceutical companies.70 The United States‘ widely
criticized actions created legitimate fears that countries could be
subject to reprisal in the form of sanctions, litigation, and trade
restrictions if they invoke compulsory licenses. While the U.S.
eventually withdrew its complaint against Brazil from the WTO
panel, the lingering effects chilled efforts by the international
community to invoke compulsory licensing.71
Article 31-bis attempted to rectify this situation by including
a provision where WTO members shall not challenge ―any
measures taken in conformity‖ with the provisions of Article 31bis or TRIPS.72 However, a lingering fear of sanctions following
the 2001 Brazil litigation along with trepidation over angering
pharmaceutical companies arguably deters developing countries
from ratifying the amendment.73
Pharmaceutical lobbying efforts have also been an obstacle
to the ratification of Article 31-bis. From the industry‘s
perspective, it simply is unfair and counterproductive to allow a
government to issue a compulsory license. The industry claims
that the high cost of research and development (an average of
$500 million per new drug) demands adequate compensation to
68

Id. at 939.
Dutfield, supra note 20, at 115–16.
70
‗t Hoen, supra note 9, at 32.
71
Greenbaum, supra note 5, at 155.
72
Article 31-bis, supra note 11, ¶ 4.
73
Weissman, supra note 32, at 1079.
69
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both recoup costs and promote the development of new
medicines.74 Interestingly, however, the pharmaceutical industry
was either first or second in Fortune Magazine‘s rankings of the
most profitable sectors of the U.S. economy for the period 1960
to 1991.75 Nevertheless, the pharmaceutical industry has been
putting ―pressure on developing nations to prevent the local
manufacture or importation of cheaper versions of the drugs
produced in countries where either they cannot be patented or
where the patents are not respected.‖76 This pressure could also
discourage developing countries from ratifying Article 31-bis or
even invoking compulsory licenses under the current TRIPS
scheme.
C. Ambiguity Surrounding “Adequate Remuneration” May
Discourage Countries from Ratifying Article 31-bis
While Article 31(h) requires adequate remuneration to the
patent holder, concerns over double remuneration were
alleviated with Article 31-bis, which, requires that the exporting
country shall bear the costs of remuneration.77 However, the
amendment equates the appropriate level of remuneration to the
―economic value to the importing member of the use of the
patent right that has been authorized.‖78
Developed countries believe that adequate remuneration
should equate to full compensation for the product.79 They posit
that intellectual property rights must be respected and valued,
and the high cost of developing drugs warrants such high
compensation. Furthermore, if there is no adequate
compensation from their perspective, incentives to research
diseases, especially those primarily affecting developing
countries, are hindered.80 While the developed countries‘
argument is persuasive, it runs counter to the Doha
Declaration‘s humanitarian goal of protecting public health.81
Additionally, allowing full compensation to patent holders

74

Nitya Nanda & Ritu Lodha, Access to Essential Medicines and
Affordable Drugs: Making Essential Medicines Affordable to the Poor, 20 WIS. INT‘L
L. J. 581, 581–82 (2002); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82
IND. L. J. 827, 836 (2007).
75
Nanda & Lodha, supra note 74, at 583.
76
Graham Dutfield, Introduction to TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:
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would create a windfall, because they would be able to collect
profits in a previously unavailable market.82
LDCs and developing countries are at the opposite end of
the spectrum in terms of compensation—they believe there
should be no remuneration, or at most, minimal remuneration,
for use of the patent. While this seems laudable from a
humanitarian perspective, a complete lack of remuneration does
not effectively balance the patent owner‘s right with the
developing country‘s need to protect public health.
Article 31-bis attempts to strike the middle ground between
full compensation and no remuneration. However, the lack of
guidelines defining adequate remuneration83 may lead exporting
countries to pay prices that are: (1) too high, thereby negating
the potential gains they receive as a result of producing low cost
medicine; or (2) too low, in which case the patent holder would
not receive adequate compensation for use of his patent.84 Thus,
countries may be wary of ratifying Article 31-bis because there
is no clear standard for determining adequate remuneration.
D. Exporting Countries Must Enact Domestic Legislation in
Order to Comply with TRIPS and Article 31-Bis – Such
Legislation is Politically Difficult to Achieve and Financially
Expensive
Each individual exporting member state must enact
legislation to ensure that its domestic laws comply with the
regulations under TRIPS and Article 31-bis.85 This creates a
significant financial and political burden on WTO member
states who export generic drugs. The legislation must not only
meet the requirements imposed by the WTO and provide
humanitarian relief to importing countries, but it must also
benefit the exporting country.86 Currently, no guidelines or
model rules exist for a legislative and institutional framework
that could be adopted by countries possessing the manufacturing
capacity, and the desire to export the generic medicines into
developing countries.87
82
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Drafting the required legislation from scratch without
guidelines or model rules is an arduous process. Countries must
expend significant resources, both from a financial and a legal
expertise perspective, to create sound public policy and
legislation.88 TRIPS addresses the difficulty of this process, and
depending on a country‘s economic development, articulates
different temporal deadlines by which legislation must be
passed.89 Still, many countries have not yet crafted the required
legislation to pass compliance under TRIPS, let alone
compliance with the recent Article 31-bis Amendment.90
In May 2004, Canada became one of the first countries to
implement legislation designed to carry out the amendment‘s
mission.91 Under the legislative scheme, Canada‘s
Commissioner of Patents could ―grant compulsory licenses
permitting the manufacture and export of low-cost versions of
patented pharmaceuticals.‖92 According to a statement by the
Canadian government, ―[r]epresentatives of Canada's generic
and brand name drug companies, and various non-governmental
organizations were consulted during the development of the
legislation and regulations. The Regime balances Canada's trade
and intellectual property obligations with the humanitarian
objective of the [Doha Declaration].‖93 It took over nine months
for Canada to draft its legislation. If developing countries do not
act immediately to implement similar legislation, the results
could be tragic. Nine months is too long for a developing
country to wait once it has declared a public health emergency.
Canada‘s legislation seeks ―to facilitate timely access to
generic versions of patented drugs, especially those needed by
least-developed or developing countries to fight HIV/AIDS,
malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases.‖94 Canada‘s Regime
ensures that the drugs exported subscribe to the same standards
as drugs for the Canadian market. Standards for safety,
effectiveness, quality and issuance are the same for all drugs
produced in Canada.95 Health Canada also reviews products for
88
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export under the compulsory licensing scheme, just as it does
for domestically produced pharmaceuticals. Review is subject
to a special fast-track process to avoid delaying drug delivery to
countries in need.96 The legislation also limits the drugs eligible
for manufacture. Only drugs listed on the World Health
Organization‘s Model List of Essential Medicines can be made,
although Canada does reserve the right to add drugs to that
list.97 The Canadian Regime utilizes less restrictive guidelines
regarding which countries can import drugs.98
Canada‘s Regime seems straightforward and the legislation
appears to strike the proper balance between safety and
expediency. Nevertheless, the legislation also ―requires the good
will of pharmaceutical companies to participate in the Regime to
fulfill the humanitarian objective of alleviating public health
problems in developing nations.‖99 Before obtaining a
compulsory license from the Canadian government, the generic
manufacturer must first seek a voluntary license from the patent
holder. This voluntary license, which depends on the goodwill
of the patent holder, makes Canada‘s legislative scheme more
rigorous than the standards for compulsory licensing under
TRIPS.100 Relying on a patent holder‘s goodwill has already
proven difficult, as evidence by the situation in Rwanda in
2007.101
While it is typically burdensome to draft and enact
legislation, there does not appear to be a feasible alternative at
the moment. States do not have a perfect legislative model to
adopt automatically.102 Coupling this difficulty with other
procedural requirements under Article 31-bis creates a situation
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where countries are unwilling to ratify the amendment simply
because of the inefficient bureaucratic hurdles.
IV. FEW COUNTRIES HAVE INVOKED ARTICLE 31-BIS OR
THE WAIVER TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO PATENTED
MEDICINES
Despite difficulty ratifying Article 31-bis, the Paragraph 6
waiver has been in force since 2003. However, no country chose
to exercise its compulsory licensing rights until 2007.103 This
failure to rely on compulsory licensing, even though it is legally
permissible suggests that ratification of Article 31-bis would not
have a significant effect on developing countries. While the
language of TRIPS and Article 31-bis is problematic,
implementation of a compulsory licensing scheme also presents
issues, as shown by Rwanda‘s experience with Canada.
On July 19, 2007, Rwanda notified the WTO‘s TRIPS
Council of its intention to import compulsory licensed drugs
from Canada for public health reasons.104 Per the requirements
of Canada‘s Regime, the generic manufacturer actively sought
voluntary licenses from GlaxoSmithKline, Shire, and
Boehringer Ingelheim, the patent holders for the drugs.105
Despite efforts to negotiate, the three pharmaceutical companies
were unwilling to issue a voluntary license.106 It was not until
Rwanda sent notification to the TRIPS Council requesting a
compulsory license that the patent holders changed their
mind.107 The Canadian government issued a compulsory license,
and the generic manufacturer began negotiations with
Rwanda.108 However, this long protracted process delayed
Rwanda‘s ability to receive the necessary drugs. While Rwanda
filled its original notice of intent with TRIPS in July 2007, its
first shipment of drugs from the Canadian generic manufacturer
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was not sent until September 2008, almost fifteen months
later.109
While one could argue that the Canadian scheme for
compulsory licensing hindered the negotiations and created the
time delay, the procedural requirements of TRIPS and Article
31-bis could be equally at fault. These procedural requirements
include creating detailed domestic legislation. Countries are not
only nervous or unwilling to ratify the amendment, but also
uncomfortable relying on compulsory licensing to ensure access
to medicines.
V. THE THREAT OF INVOKING COMPULSORY LICENSES CAN
MAKE PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES MORE WILLING TO
NEGOTIATE
Even if countries are not going to issue compulsory licenses,
there remains a short-term benefit in maintaining an effective
compulsory licensing scheme under Article 31-bis. The mere
possibility of compulsory licensing tends to strengthen the
bargaining position of governments, even if it is rarely invoked.
For example, Brazil has threatened to use compulsory licenses
as permitted under the TRIPS Agreement.110 Such overtures
influenced numerous pharmaceutical companies, including
Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, and Roche
Brazil to come to the negotiation table. Many of these
companies ultimately made drastic concessions regarding the
medications‘ costs.111
Threats of compulsory licensing worked for Brazil during
negotiations with drug companies to lower the prices of antiAIDS drugs. It also worked for the U.S. when negotiating with
Bayer for Cipro during the anthrax scare.112 However, the
international community should not rely on threats of
compulsory licensing to provide developing countries access to
medicines. There is a fundamental difference between Brazil or
the United States threatening to issue a compulsory license, and
a small sub-Saharan country threatening to do the same. Brazil
109
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and the United States have large populations, which constitute a
large share of the pharmaceutical consumption market.
Pharmaceutical companies are more willing to lose some profits
in these large markets than lose all profits to a compulsory
license.113 A small sub-Saharan country with far fewer
consumers would not possess the same amount of bargaining
power. Thus, threats of compulsory licensing are only a shortterm solution for many countries in their attempts to gain access
to medicines.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, there is ―neither a strong experiential basis for
recommending acceptance of the [Article 31-bis] Amendment,
nor of declining to accept it.‖114 Most developing countries
have yet to ratify Article 31-bis, likely because they fear
repercussions from developed countries, or from the
pharmaceutical companies themselves.
The procedural requirements necessary to comply with
Article 31-bis and the TRIPS compulsory scheme are
complicated and unduly bureaucratic. At the end of the day, the
purpose of the amendment is to deliver medicines to those most
in need. If stringent procedural requirements make compulsory
licensing unattractive as a means to obtaining medicines, then
the WTO needs to go back to the drawing board and develop a
new regime.
WTO General Council Char Mohamed insists that while the
waiver and amendment have not been used as often as
anticipated, both have still ―been effective, since drug prices
have fallen significantly since [they were] adopted in 2003.‖115
While the lower drug costs may increase a developing country‘s
access to medicines, the WTO still needs to do more to ensure
greater access. After all, the international community cannot
allow intellectual property rights to interfere and ―prevent
[WTO] [m]embers from taking measures to protect public
health.‖116
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